Amazon cover image
Image from Amazon.com

The moral economy : why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens / Samuel Bowles.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Castle lectures in ethics, politics, and economicsPublisher: New Haven : Yale University Press [2016]Copyright date: ©2016Description: 1 online resource (288 pages) : illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780300221084
  • 0300221088
Other title:
  • Why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Moral economy.DDC classification:
  • 330 22
LOC classification:
  • K487.E3 B69 2016eb
  • HB72 .B69 2016eb
  • HB1-130
Online resources:
Contents:
The problem with homo economicus -- A constitution for knaves -- Moral sentiments and material interests -- Incentives as information -- A liberal civic culture -- The legislator's dilemma -- A mandate for Aristotle's legislator.
Cover; Half Title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Content; Preface; I: The Problem with Homo economicus; II: A Constitution for Knaves; III: Moral Sentiments and Material Interests; IV: Incentives as Information; V: A Liberal Civic Culture; VI: The Legislator's Dilemma; VII: A Mandate for Aristotle's Legislator; Appendixes; Notes; Works Cited; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V; W; Y; Z
Summary: Should the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
Holdings
Item type Current library Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
eBook eBook e-Library EBSCO Business Available
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Should the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.

Print version record.

The problem with homo economicus -- A constitution for knaves -- Moral sentiments and material interests -- Incentives as information -- A liberal civic culture -- The legislator's dilemma -- A mandate for Aristotle's legislator.

Cover; Half Title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Content; Preface; I: The Problem with Homo economicus; II: A Constitution for Knaves; III: Moral Sentiments and Material Interests; IV: Incentives as Information; V: A Liberal Civic Culture; VI: The Legislator's Dilemma; VII: A Mandate for Aristotle's Legislator; Appendixes; Notes; Works Cited; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V; W; Y; Z

Master record variable field(s) change: 050, 650

Powered by Koha