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Unfunded pension systems [electronic resource] : ageing and migration / Silke Uebelmesser.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Contributions to economic analysis ; 264.Publication details: Amsterdam ; London : Elsevier, 2004.Description: 1 online resource (xii, 271 pages) : illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780080474670
  • 0080474675
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Unfunded pension systems.DDC classification:
  • 331.252 22
LOC classification:
  • HD7105.3 .U33 2004eb
Other classification:
  • 85.61
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover -- Introduction to the Series -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Focus of the analysis -- 1.2 Structure and overview -- Chapter 2. Unfunded Pension Systems -- 2.1 Mechanisms of unfunded and funded pension systems -- 2.2 The concept of implicit taxes and implicit debt -- 2.3 Conclusion -- Appendix A2. Solow-Swan growth model -- Appendix B2. Derivation of Equation 2.28 -- Chapter 3. Projected Development of Fundamental Factors -- 3.1 Determinants of the population growth -- 3.2 Development of the total population -- 3.3 Conclusion -- Appendix A3. Development of the population -- Appendix B3. Dependency ratio -- Chapter 4. Country Studies -- 4.1 Characteristics of pension systems -- 4.2 Recent reforms of pension systems -- 4.3 Conclusion -- Chapter 5. Welfare Analysis of Pension Reforms -- 5.1 Intergenerationally efficient reforms -- 5.2 Intrapersonally efficient reforms -- Appendix A5. Standardised work biographies -- Appendix B5. Derivation of Equation 5.14 -- Appendix C5. Description of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) -- Appendix D5. Estimates for the wage equation: men and married women -- Appendix E5. Results of the Tobit model: smaller sub-groups -- Appendix F5. Time structure of implicit taxes and wage elasticities -- Chapter 6. Political Feasibility of Pension Reforms -- 6.1 Intergenerational redistribution -- 6.2 Voting model -- 6.3 Feasibility of pension reforms -- 6.4 Conclusion -- Appendix A6. Calculating the median age -- Appendix B6. Calculating the indifference age -- Chapter 7. Mobility as a Counterforce to Gerontocracy -- 7.1 Voting model with mobility -- 7.2 Mobility as a commitment device -- Appendix A7. Social planner problem -- Appendix B7. Monetary costs of education -- Chapter 8. Qualitative Aspects of Migration -- 8.1 Description of the data -- 8.2 Estimation of the intention to migrate -- 8.3 Conclusion -- Appendix A8. Descriptive statistics -- Appendix B8. Probit estimation -- Appendix C8. Probit model -- Chapter 9. Sustainability of Pension Systems with Systems Competition -- 9.1 Status quo -- 9.2 Theoretical results when pension systems are similar -- 9.3 Institutional distribution of competence between the national and the European Level -- 9.4 Comparison of the theoretical and institutional results -- 9.5 Alternative options when pension systems are different -- 9.6 Conclusion -- Appendix A9. Art. 117 ToR and Art. 136 ECT -- Appendix B9. Art. 118 ToR and Art. 137 ECT -- Chapter 10. Conclusion -- References -- Symbol Glossary -- Subject Index -- Last Page.
Summary: Pension systems in most industrialised countries are unfunded, i.e. they are pay-as-you-go financed and thus depend on a well-balanced ratio (old) recipients to (young) contributors. This so-called dependency ratio will worsen significantly in the next few decades due to two developments: ageing of the population and increased labour mobility. This book analyses the viability of unfunded pension systems in the presence of the projected demographic evolution. The analysis focuses on questions concerning a) efficiency considerations and the possibility of welfare improvements; b) political econom.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.

Cover -- Introduction to the Series -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Focus of the analysis -- 1.2 Structure and overview -- Chapter 2. Unfunded Pension Systems -- 2.1 Mechanisms of unfunded and funded pension systems -- 2.2 The concept of implicit taxes and implicit debt -- 2.3 Conclusion -- Appendix A2. Solow-Swan growth model -- Appendix B2. Derivation of Equation 2.28 -- Chapter 3. Projected Development of Fundamental Factors -- 3.1 Determinants of the population growth -- 3.2 Development of the total population -- 3.3 Conclusion -- Appendix A3. Development of the population -- Appendix B3. Dependency ratio -- Chapter 4. Country Studies -- 4.1 Characteristics of pension systems -- 4.2 Recent reforms of pension systems -- 4.3 Conclusion -- Chapter 5. Welfare Analysis of Pension Reforms -- 5.1 Intergenerationally efficient reforms -- 5.2 Intrapersonally efficient reforms -- Appendix A5. Standardised work biographies -- Appendix B5. Derivation of Equation 5.14 -- Appendix C5. Description of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) -- Appendix D5. Estimates for the wage equation: men and married women -- Appendix E5. Results of the Tobit model: smaller sub-groups -- Appendix F5. Time structure of implicit taxes and wage elasticities -- Chapter 6. Political Feasibility of Pension Reforms -- 6.1 Intergenerational redistribution -- 6.2 Voting model -- 6.3 Feasibility of pension reforms -- 6.4 Conclusion -- Appendix A6. Calculating the median age -- Appendix B6. Calculating the indifference age -- Chapter 7. Mobility as a Counterforce to Gerontocracy -- 7.1 Voting model with mobility -- 7.2 Mobility as a commitment device -- Appendix A7. Social planner problem -- Appendix B7. Monetary costs of education -- Chapter 8. Qualitative Aspects of Migration -- 8.1 Description of the data -- 8.2 Estimation of the intention to migrate -- 8.3 Conclusion -- Appendix A8. Descriptive statistics -- Appendix B8. Probit estimation -- Appendix C8. Probit model -- Chapter 9. Sustainability of Pension Systems with Systems Competition -- 9.1 Status quo -- 9.2 Theoretical results when pension systems are similar -- 9.3 Institutional distribution of competence between the national and the European Level -- 9.4 Comparison of the theoretical and institutional results -- 9.5 Alternative options when pension systems are different -- 9.6 Conclusion -- Appendix A9. Art. 117 ToR and Art. 136 ECT -- Appendix B9. Art. 118 ToR and Art. 137 ECT -- Chapter 10. Conclusion -- References -- Symbol Glossary -- Subject Index -- Last Page.

Pension systems in most industrialised countries are unfunded, i.e. they are pay-as-you-go financed and thus depend on a well-balanced ratio (old) recipients to (young) contributors. This so-called dependency ratio will worsen significantly in the next few decades due to two developments: ageing of the population and increased labour mobility. This book analyses the viability of unfunded pension systems in the presence of the projected demographic evolution. The analysis focuses on questions concerning a) efficiency considerations and the possibility of welfare improvements; b) political econom.

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