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The reflexive nature of consciousness / Greg Janzen.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Advances in consciousness research ; v. 72.Publication details: Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : John Benjamins Pub. Co., ©2008.Description: 1 online resource (vi, 186 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9789027291684
  • 9027291683
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Reflexive nature of consciousness.DDC classification:
  • 126 22
LOC classification:
  • B808.9 .J36 2008eb
NLM classification:
  • W1
  • B 808.9
Online resources:
Contents:
Introduction -- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character -- Some remarks on methodology -- Some semantics of "consciousness" -- Preamble -- Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive -- State consciousness -- Unconscious mental states -- Self-consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness -- A formula for state consciousness -- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula -- Putative counterexamples -- Non-conscious phenomenality? -- Summary -- Consciousness and self-awareness -- Preamble -- A gloss on intentionality -- The transitivity principle -- Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle -- Higher-orderism -- Preamble -- The higher-order theory of consciousness -- A "one-state" alternative -- Preamble -- The Brentanian model -- Objections and replies -- Representationalism -- Preamble -- The representational theory of phenomenal character -- The nature of phenomenal character -- Preamble -- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness -- Some brief remarks on privacy -- Conclusion.
Summary: Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, "implicit" awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or "what-it-is-like," dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis tha.
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 173-182) and indexes.

Introduction -- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character -- Some remarks on methodology -- Some semantics of "consciousness" -- Preamble -- Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive -- State consciousness -- Unconscious mental states -- Self-consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness -- A formula for state consciousness -- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula -- Putative counterexamples -- Non-conscious phenomenality? -- Summary -- Consciousness and self-awareness -- Preamble -- A gloss on intentionality -- The transitivity principle -- Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle -- Higher-orderism -- Preamble -- The higher-order theory of consciousness -- A "one-state" alternative -- Preamble -- The Brentanian model -- Objections and replies -- Representationalism -- Preamble -- The representational theory of phenomenal character -- The nature of phenomenal character -- Preamble -- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness -- Some brief remarks on privacy -- Conclusion.

Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, "implicit" awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or "what-it-is-like," dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis tha.

Print version record.

WorldCat record variable field(s) change: 650

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