Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions [electronic resource] / by Hastagiri Prakash, Ramasuri Narayanam, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari.

From the contents Motivating Problems in Network Economics -- Foundations of Mechanisms Design -- Strategic Form Games -- Dominant Strategy Equilibria -- Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- Bayesian Games -- Social Choice Functions -- Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem -- Properties of Social Choice Functions -- Bayesian Implementation -- Revenue Equivalence Theorem -- Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions -- Internet Advertising -- Sponsored Search Auction -- Individual Rationality -- Computational Complexity -- Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing -- The G-DSIC Mechanism -- The G-BIC Mechanism -- G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism -- Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes -- Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes -- Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols -- A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol -- A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol -- Key Applications Areas.

With the advent of the Internet and other modern information and communication technologies, a magnificent opportunity has opened up for introducing new, innovative models of commerce, markets, and business. Creating these innovations calls for significant interdisciplinary interaction among researchers in computer science, communication networks, operations research, economics, mathematics, sociology, and management science. In the emerging era of new problems and challenges, one particular tool that has found widespread applications is mechanism design. The focus of this book is to explore game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. It provides a sound foundation of relevant concepts and theory, to help apply mechanism design to problem solving in a rigorous way.