| 000 | 05221cam a2200613Ki 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | ocn928387776 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20240829101220.0 | ||
| 006 | m d | ||
| 007 | cr cnu---unuuu | ||
| 008 | 151109s2015 nju o 000 0 eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aN$T _beng _erda _epn _cN$T _dYDXCP _dCDX _dIDEBK _dEBLCP |
||
| 019 | _a946309200 | ||
| 020 |
_a9789814651257 _qelectronic bk. |
||
| 020 |
_a9814651257 _qelectronic bk. |
||
| 020 | _z9789814651240 | ||
| 020 | _z9814651249 | ||
| 035 |
_a(OCoLC)928387776 _z(OCoLC)946309200 |
||
| 050 | 4 |
_aHB3722 _b.F57 2015eb |
|
| 072 | 7 |
_aBUS _x069000 _2bisacsh |
|
| 072 | 7 |
_aBUS _x055000 _2bisacsh |
|
| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_a330.9/0511 _223 |
| 049 | _aMAIN | ||
| 245 | 0 | 4 |
_aThe first great financial crisis of the 21st century : _ba retrospective / _cedited by James R. Barth (Auburn University, USA & Milken Institue, USA), George G. Kaufman (Loyola University Chicago, USA). |
| 264 | 1 |
_aNew Jersey : _bWorld Scientific, _c[2015] |
|
| 300 | _a1 online resource. | ||
| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
||
| 337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
||
| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
||
| 490 | 0 |
_aWorld Scientific-Now Publishers series in business ; _vvol. 9 |
|
| 588 | 0 | _aPrint version record. | |
| 505 | 0 | _aPreface; About the Authors; Chapter 1 The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2010: The Sinners and their Sins; 1 Introduction; 2 US Sinners; 2.1 Central bankers (Monetary policy); 2.2 Commercial and investment bankers (Initial and ultimate lenders; 2.3 Credit rating agencies; 2.4 Financial engineers; 2.5 Government (Congress and the administration); 2.6 Investors (Ultimate lenders); 2.7 Mortgage borrowers; 2.8 Mortgage brokers (Salesmen); 2.9 Prudential bank regulators; 3 Conclusion; Appendix; References; Chapter 2 The Costs of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction. | |
| 505 | 8 | _a2 A Weak and Stumbling Recovery3 Measuring the Costs of the Financial Crisis; 4 Additional Perspectives on the Costs of the Crisis; 5 Summing Up the Costs; 6 Concluding Comments: Hopefully Never Again; References; Chapter 3 The US Financial Crisis and the Great Recession: Counting the Costs; 1 Introduction; 2 Lost GDP; 3 Depleted Wealth; 4 The Costs of Government Support; 4.1 Data and methodology; 4.2 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 4.3 The National Credit Union Administration; 4.4 The Federal Reserve's programs; 4.5 Treasury programs; 5 Social Costs. | |
| 505 | 8 | _a5.1 Unemployment and labor force losses5.2 Bankruptcies and foreclosures; 5.3 Income and wealth inequality; 5.4 Increased poverty; 5.5 Reduced access to health care; 5.6 Lower fertility; 5.7 More education but more student debt; 6 Conclusions; References; Chapter 4 US Housing Policy and the Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction; 2 The Development of Underwriting Standards; 3 The Affordable-Housing Goals and the Decline in Underwriting Standards; 4 The GSEs' Failure to Disclose their Risk-Taking; 5 The Great Housing Bubble, 1997-2007; 6 The Effect of Bank Capital and Accounting Rules. | |
| 505 | 8 | _a7 Fair Value (Mark-to-Market) Accounting8 The Arrival of Moral Hazard; 9 2008: Growing Weakness Among the Largest Banks; 10 Chaos; References; Chapter 5 Playing for Time: The Fed's Attempt to Manage the Crisis as a Liquidity Problem; 1 Introduction; 2 Causes of the Crisis; 2.1 Innovations in real estate lending, the ABCP market, and their roles in the crisis; 3 The Unfolding of the Crisis; 3.1 Liquidity v. solvency?; 3.2 The liquidity phase; 4 The Fed's Policy Responses; 4.1 Discount window lending (DWL); 4.2 The Term Auction Facility (TAF); 4.3 Central Bank Liquidity Swaps Program (CBLS). | |
| 505 | 8 | _a4.4 Single-Tranche Open Market Operations (ST OMO)4.5 Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF); 4.6 Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF); 5 Assessing the Effects of Institutional Liquidity Facilities; 6 Market Liquidity: The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF); 7 Which Institutions Received the Largest Amount of Liquidity Assistance?; 7.1 Special benefi ts for special institutions; 8 Policy Concerns Shift From Illiquidity to Insolvency; 8.1 Why the long delay in recognition of solvency problems?; 9 Concluding Comments; References. | |
| 590 | _aMaster record variable field(s) change: 082, 650 | ||
| 650 | 0 |
_aFinancial crises. _9182122 |
|
| 650 | 7 |
_aFinancial crises. _2fast _0(OCoLC)fst00924607 _9182122 |
|
| 650 | 7 |
_aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General _2bisacsh _9206441 |
|
| 650 | 7 |
_aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Reference _2bisacsh _9206442 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aFinancial crises. _9182122 |
|
| 655 | 4 |
_aElectronic books. _9396 |
|
| 700 | 1 |
_aBarth, James R. _9426910 |
|
| 700 | 1 |
_aKaufman, George G. _9303833 |
|
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrint version: _tFirst great financial crisis of the 21st century _z9789814651240 _w(DLC) 2014046647 _w(OCoLC)897632468 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 |
_3EBSCOhost _uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1091526 |
| 938 |
_aEBSCOhost _bEBSC _n1091526 |
||
| 938 |
_aYBP Library Services _bYANK _n12681855 |
||
| 938 |
_aCoutts Information Services _bCOUT _n33111242 |
||
| 938 |
_aIngram Digital eBook Collection _bIDEB _ncis33111242 |
||
| 938 |
_aEBL - Ebook Library _bEBLB _nEBL4394915 |
||
| 994 |
_a92 _bN$T |
||
| 999 |
_c663284 _d663284 |
||