Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation
Annen, Kurt, 1967-
Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation [electronic resource] / prepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers. - [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2012. - 1 online resource (37 pages). - IMF working paper ; WP/12/204 . - IMF working paper ; WP/12/204. .
Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Aug. 13, 2012). "Middle East and Central Asia Dept." "August 2012."
Includes bibliographical references.
This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.
1475559577 9781475559576
Economic assistance.
Economic assistance.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Macroeconomics
POLITICAL SCIENCE / Economic Conditions
Electronic books.
HG3881.5.I58 / W67 No. 12/204eb
339.22
Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation [electronic resource] / prepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers. - [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2012. - 1 online resource (37 pages). - IMF working paper ; WP/12/204 . - IMF working paper ; WP/12/204. .
Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Aug. 13, 2012). "Middle East and Central Asia Dept." "August 2012."
Includes bibliographical references.
This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.
1475559577 9781475559576
Economic assistance.
Economic assistance.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Macroeconomics
POLITICAL SCIENCE / Economic Conditions
Electronic books.
HG3881.5.I58 / W67 No. 12/204eb
339.22