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Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation [electronic resource] / prepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: IMF working paper ; WP/12/204.Publication details: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2012.Description: 1 online resource (37 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 1475559577
  • 9781475559576
Subject(s): Genre/Form: DDC classification:
  • 339.22 23
LOC classification:
  • HG3881.5.I58 W67 No. 12/204eb
Online resources: Summary: This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.
Holdings
Item type Current library Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
eBook eBook e-Library EBSCO Business Available
Total holds: 0

Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Aug. 13, 2012).

This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.

Includes bibliographical references.

"Middle East and Central Asia Dept."

"August 2012."

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